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One of the most delicate functions taken on by the police is the control 
of public order. Indeed, for people involved in demonstrations, the police 
represent the very face of state power (Lipsky, 1970; see also Muir, 1977). 
Direct interventions by the police to restore public order, moreover, put the 
police on the front pages of the press and increase the likelihood of public 
criticism (della Porta, 1994). It is likely, then, that because of this particular 
delicacy, the strategies of the police concerning the question of public order are 
multiple and ever-changing. So much so that important changes in the police 
organization often follow periods of political turmoil (for instance, Geary 1985; 
Morgan, 1987; Reiner, 1996), while a weakening in the repressive capacity of 
the state has been considered as a precondition for cycles of protest (for 
instance, Tilly, 1978; Skocpol, 1979; Me Adam, 1982).
In Italy, as well as in other Western democracies, following above all the 
great wave of protest that came to a peak in the last years of the 1960s, the 
strategy of control of public order has been fundamentally transformed. Whilst 
the diffuse concept of the right to public protest has tended to be strengthened 
during this period, strategies of intervention have become distanced from the 
coercive model of policing which had predominated until then. During the 
course of the 1970s and 1980s, despite some setbacks and reversals, it is 
possible to trace a growing tendency to tolerate certain violations of the law that 
are now considered as minor offences. During these two decades, the public 
debate concerning police interventions into protest demonstrations followed a 
fixed scheme, between the left’s 'coalition for civil rights’ which criticized any 
harsh repression, and the right’s ‘coalition for law and order’, which supported 
a tougher approach. By the 1990s, this situation seems to have changed. 
Whereas the movements of the left have little by little abandoned the most 
violent forms of protest which sometimes sparked off a spiral of conflict with 
the police, violence connected with football fans and racist skinheads has at the 
same time grown. In particular, on certain occasions involving attacks on 
immigrants, the police have been accused - and not only in Italy - of being 
excessively tolerant, this time by the left.
In both the eyes of political actors and social scientists, the problems 
connected with public order in Italy have changed enormously. Most observers 
now speak of an overriding pragmatism among political groups, and the 
widespread strategy of non-violence. The systematic, semi-armed conflicts 



























































































Police Knowledge and Public Order: Some Reflections on the Italian Case
fights between ‘paninari’ (an Italian youth culture based on casual fashion) and 
punks at the beginning of the 1980s. One of the characteristics of this decade, 
however, was the perceived escalation and ritualization of violence linked with 
football supporters. The 1990s opened with new episodes of violence, connected 
predominantly with racism against immigrants from outside the EC (‘extra- 
comunitari’). From the middle of the 1980s onwards, small gangs of so-called 
‘nazi-skins’ fomented aggression against those they saw as ‘different’, even 
infiltrating the world of ‘ult'as’ (hard-line football fans). Episodes of violence 
were also seen in connection with the squatted youth centres.
In order to understand the strategic choices of the police about questions 
of public order, we must look in several directions. The study of collective 
movements suggests in general that state reactions to challengers are influenced 
by specific characteristics of the political opportunity structure: in particular, the 
existing dominant culture and institutions (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 1995; 
Tarrow, 1994). The political ‘complexion’ of a government is (or at least has 
been) another decisive variable in explaining strategic choices concerning public 
order. One other element intervenes, however, between the ‘reality’ of the 
situation and police action: the perception that the police have of disturbances, 
of the techniques at their disposal, and of the requests that come from outside 
their ranks. These perceptions make up part of what can be called police 
knowledge, a term which refers to the images held by the police about their role 
and the external challenges which they are asked to face (Manning, 1979: 48-9). 
We may assume then that, as in other spheres of social life, the activity of the 
police to control public order is influenced first, by the professional culture of 
the police, that is by the images the police hold about their own role - or, put 
another way, of the “totality of assumptions, widespread among actors, relative 
to the ‘cause’ to which they must be committed” (Worden, 1989: 674) - and 
second, by the environmental culture of the police, that is the totality of 
assumptions they hold about external reality.
In the course of this research, I have sought to reconstruct this police 
knowledge through in-depth interviews, following semi-structured questionnaires, 
conducted with police officials in two cities: Florence and Milan. These 
interviews have described first of all the police perceptions about the strategies 
available to reestablish order, singling out four different models of police control 
(Parts 1 and 2 of this working paper). Later on, I tried to explain police choices 





























































































disturbances to public order (Part 3), and the role of the police themselves (Part 
4), the politicians (Part 5), and public opinion (Part 6).
This text draws on illustrations taken from around 30 interviews in 
Florence and Milan.1 In addition to these interviews, we also made close 
observations of certain police interventions in situations concerning public order, 
and interviews were held with actors who are ‘challenging’ public order.
1. The control of public order in the 1990s
Studies on the evolution of police styles have presented a complex image, 
describing at the same time a militarization of the police, but also a growing 
attention to de-escalation; the increase of technological means for the use of 
force and at the same time the development of a sophisticated bargaining. How 
does the Italian case fit into this framework? What is the central model of 
control of public order in present-day Italy? How does this connect with the 
images that we have already set out of the actors behind disturbances?
1.1. The police force and public order in Italy: the organizational structure
As a first point, it must be noted that in Italy, as elsewhere, an 
intervention in favour of public order involves various institutional actors. At a 
local level, the political duty to maintain public order falls to the Prefetto (who 
represents the central government at the local level), whereas technically the 
Questore (the head of the police) is responsible for public order. When potential 
disturbances to public order arise - when, in particular a gathering of a large 
crowd or political initiative is foreseen - the Questore orders the police to 
become involved, delegating an official to command the forces in action. The 
principal police corps who may intervene are the Digos (branch for general 
investigations and special operations, an everyday political policing unit), and 
the Reparto Mobile, for rapid reaction forces. The plain-clothes Digos have 
responsibilities for information gathering; the uniformed Reparto Mobile is 
available for forcible intervention. Whilst the Digos forms part of the Questura,
1 In the case of Florence, seven officials from the questura (police headquarters) were 
interviewed; in Milan, five officials from the questura and ten from the Reparto Mobile 
(police action force) were interviewed, in addition to the head of the centre of study and 
research on the police, run by SIULP (the largest police trade union). The interviews in 




























































































Police Knowledge and Public Order: Some Reflections on the Italian Case
the Reparto Mobile is under the direct command of the head of police: the 
Questore must therefore ask the head of police to assign a certain number of 
men or women in uniform, who may be taken from various units of the city 
under the Questura' s control, or from other units. In the sphere of public order, 
the Questore also commands the Carabinieri, who are expected to cover half of 
the policing duties in the case of large scale police interventions. In exceptional 
circumstances the army may also be mobilized. In certain situations, the Squadra 
Mobile (Mobile Squad) may sometimes also intervene, a squad which is 
composed mainly of agents in civilian dress who are responsible for judicial 
policing; the Volanti (Flying Squad), a uniformed patrol whose job is to watch 
for criminal offences; and the Polizia Scientifica (Scientific Police), plain-clothes 
agents and officials who are responsible for gathering evidence on possible 
crimes.
In the words of a Florentine official, a police intervention over public 
order would be centralized, and involve a series of different actors:
"Every section concerned with public order... starts with the "communication" [by the 
organizers] to the Questura. Three days before the demonstration, and on this basis the 
Questore get informed on the demonstration, makes an evaluation of the route of the 
march and the size and type of the march, and then sends out orders on this basis that 
indicate the following: what type of demonstration it will be, who is directing the 
forces of public order, who is being given duties, the size of the force to be assigned, 
and possible special assignments relative to the particular demonstration. Each 
demonstration is normally preceded by an inspection of the place where the 
demonstration is to take place... and so the ASNU is called to empty all the litter bins, 
ENEL to check all the electrical apparatus, SIP to check telephones, and the water 
board, etc. There are orders which indicate how the place is to be inspected, and 
which give reminders of the legal regulations of the event: it can be illegal to do 
things in certain ways, and this gives an indication of how things must be done. 
Assuming it is a large demonstration, the Prefetto appoints the committee responsible 
for order and public safety, that is, it gives directives of a general nature that can then 
be translated by the Questura into orders for action, which will say how forces 
protecting public order will be deployed" (Interview Florence, 10 November 1994).
The structure of command over police intervention is hierarchical, with police 
agents responding only to their direct superior. Hence, according to the same 
interviewee:
"The philosophy of public order requires that every decision comes from the chief in 
charge, because it is never (or almost never) the case that there is only one person 
policing public order. There are at least seven or eight officials depending on the 





























































































command would be that whoever intervenes, when it is made necessary by the 
situation that is created, is authorized to react preventively by the chief of service. 
Indeed, very often, ideally at least, it would be that if there is time, any forcible 
intervention is first advised to the chief superintendent” (Interview Florence, 10 
November 1994).
Other actors, external to the police, may be involved in the management 
of public order, if only in a consultancy capacity. For more significant 
interventions, the Prefetto may make use of the consultancy of the Provincial 
Committee for Public Order and Safety, in which representatives of different 
political parties may participate in addition to the Questore and Chief of the 
Carabinieri. After hearing the opinion of the committee, the Questore makes the 
order requesting the Minister for a certain number of men and women from the 
Reparto Mobile and Carabinieri to be assigned. Only after this will the chief 
officers of the Reparto Mobile be contacted (Interview Milan, 10-11 October 1994).
1.2. Coercion, containment, consensus: The use offorce in the control o f public 
order
In the course of our interviews we sought to uncover the objectives of 
these diverse actors concerning public order interventions in different 
situations.2 3In the first place, it can be said that the most prevalent perception 
among the police is that their presence is oriented primarily towards the defusing 
o f a situation?  Nearly all the officials interviewed agreed on defining the 
strategy used in recent times as a strategy designed to seek a consensus through 
“dialogue” with protestors.
"I would say that there has been a period - which does not apply for certain 
demonstrations such as those at the football stadium for example - in which on each 
occasion a dialogue is sought with whichever go-between comes forward. We always 
look to avoid incidents. If you think about it, all demonstrations, of whatever kind or
2 In follow-up work, in-depth interviews with actors “on the other side of the barricades” 
- autonomous groups and trade union members - will allow us to compare the social 
construction of reality of the police with the social construction of other actors involved.
3 Similar tendencies are stressed not only about long-lasting democracies—such as France 
(Fillieule and Jobard, 1996), Great Britain (Waddington, 1996), and the United States 
(McCarthy, McPhail and Schweingruber, 1996)—but also about recent democracies, such as 
Spain (Jaime Jimenez, 1996). For a comparative approach, see della Porta and Reiter (1996) 




























































































Police Knowledge and Public Order: Some Reflections on the Italian Case
type, are normally preceded by direct contacts with police headquarters or the officials 
of the Digos or other forces to agree on the course of the march, in order to know 
who we should speak with, to see what kind of situation we will be faced with, to 
understand what the real issues of the march are, so that we can prepare a possible 
dialogue with the people who are organizing the demonstration. In this sense, the 
tactics, particularly during the 1980s, have changed the style of interlocution, that is 
demonstrators do not find themselves in front of masked men with helmets and batons: 
there is always some attempt at mediation" (Interview Florence, 10 November 1994).
In terms of the instruments of forcible intervention, the choice of dialogue 
seems to have come with a limitation on the type of coercive tactics considered 
appropriate to face public order problems. Not only is the use of firearms 
nowconsidered inappropriate to these situations, and certain "tougher" techniques 
such as jeep charges or the water cannon have fallen into disuse, but the 
shortcomings of baton charge and tear gas are also often emphasized.4
In general, recourse to a repressive intervention, whether with batons or 
tear gas, is, however, considered to be a failure in policing terms. According to 
the officials, the primary objective of a police intervention in defence of public 
order is to avoid "upsetting the balance of the situation", and hence producing 
disturbances to the peace. For this reason, especially when there are more radical 
groups of people within a larger peaceful demonstration, a strategy of 
"underenforcing the law" and "containment" prevails which, however, takes on 
different characteristics according to the different actors that are “threatening” 
public order. In spite of the often-quoted principle of “neutrality”, by which the 
police claim that “the reaction of the police is always the same”, in reality their 
responses to a range of challenges in different public order situations, reveal 
diverse models of policing, each formulated with regard to the particular 
problem posed. As a young vice-superintendent of the Reparto Mobile observed:
"Clearly, when we are talking about Leoncavallo, that is demonstrations with a 
particularly high political element, then we always keep our distance. With the ultra 
football fans, the opposite is the case: we get right in amongst them. With the ultras,
4 As regards tear gas, the intcrvewers underline the technical limits of its use: 
atmospheric conditions, when there is a downwind; logistical conditions, which require escape 
routes for those trying to get away; and the general problem of the large numbers of 
uninvolved persons present. As for baton charges, two limits are indicated above all: firstly, 
while the point of intervention is, according to the police manuals, to stay compact and 
together, during the charge the officers enter into direct “combat” with the protesters, with the 
risk of injury; the baton charge also creates the risk of “direct contact”, with a consequent loss 





























































































if you give them 50 metres, they start throwing stones at you. When we want to show 
our muscles, especially with the Leoncavallo people, the policy of the Questura in the 
last few years has usually been to send a massive and highly visible police presence, 
of a size such that it is made very clear that the balance of forces is tipped strongly 
in our favour. With such a visible presence, they can see that if they misbehave 
themselves we are going to be there en masse... For the demonstration of May 1st, we 
had a purely passive presence. With the workers on May 1st, it’s almost like it was 
our celebration, our presence is purely a formality, with the idea that we are there 
simply to demonstrate our own presence. Obviously, we are always alert, and on the 
spot (even if, may be, more hidden), because you never know when someone might 
get into the crowd and cause a disturbance. However, we never put on our helmets on 
May 1st, we just walk along quietly at the front of the march, with the utmost 
calmness. And it’s really because there is no longer that sense of opposition with the 
workers’ movement nowadays...” (Interview Milan, 24 November 1994).
For large demonstrations organized by the trade unions or political parties, 
a cooperative model of managing public order seems to predominate. This is 
based on collaboration between the organizers and the police force, with policing 
oriented towards protecting, in equal measure, demonstrators and potential 
“targets of risk”. As one official from Milan observed:
“Demonstrations by workers, civil servants, whatever, we’re there for all of them. 
Also because we are no longer a force opposed to them. In fact, people see us as 
workers ourselves, who are there to guarantee everyone’s security ... What I always 
say now is that we are not there to stop them from causing a riot, but rather that we 
now accompany the demonstration to make sure they can demonstrate without being 
disturbed themselves" (Interview Milan, 24 November 1994).
In these cases, there is an awereness on the part of the police that the legitimacy 
of a demonstration lies in the willingness of the protesters to avoid upsetting the 
precarious balance of public order. For example, this is how the police’s 
involvement in the demonstration in Florence in support of the general strike of 
14 October 1994 was retold in hindsight:
"I n,contain that at a demonstration such as the one in Florence on 14 October, 
150,000 people, it is implausible to think of breaking up the march by force. It’s 
obvious therefore that the only thing we can do is to be as preventive as possible, with 
as much information as possible and rationalization of resources. But it is obvious that 
there are really serious risks involved with a march that starts in Piazza San Marco 
and finishes by moving into Piazza Santa Croce four hours later. While they are 
following this long route there are a thousand possibilities that they will be attacked 
by people outside the march or that they will attack someone themselves. In this case, 




























































































Police Knowledge and Public Order: Some Reflections on the Italian Case
places we classify as such, that is the offices of political parties, trade unions or other 
political groups, because we realized that the march as such was beyond a certain size 
that couldn’t be monitored entirely, unless we deployed the entire police force to 
accompany it. Apart from anything else, this would have been a Chilean style solution, 
and would have entailed an enormous deployment of police forces, and so it is for this 
reason that mediation, and the building up of knowledge and information, is used to 
give priority to guarding certain potential targets that might be attacked by those who 
might, if they get more agitated, break away from the march” (Interview Florence, 
10 November 1994).5
In these situations, the perceived danger is the infiltration of violent 
groups. A forcible intervention is considered to be inappropriate because it could 
cause peaceful demonstrators to get involved. Thus, a policeman explained, for 
instance, the reason for the "soft" handling of a demonstration during the Gulf 
War:
"There were some stones, money, bottles, etc. thrown at a church. It was during a 
demonstration about the Gulf War. In the centre of the demonstration, there was a 
small group from one of the social centres, with certain intentions. We were lined up 
in front of the church, fixed and immobile, and then these stones, bottles and stuff are 
thrown. We didn’t react in any way because these people, in the middle of a big 
demonstration of 4-5,000 people, well, we would have immediately created a panic 
and disturbance amongst all the others. Or we might have got ourselves hurt, or others, 
confronting people who had nothing to do with it. For four people who were throwing 
stones. It wasn’t the right time to intervene. You understand that to go and arrest a 
protester in the middle of a demonstration, even with an enormous deployment of 
officers, that would just create more disorder rather than restore public order. So the 
officials were right not to order us to arrest a protester who was writing graffiti on a 
wall. That is, those responsible for public order prefer a wall to be written on than a 
big disturbance in the streets. And, in my opinion, 1 think they are right" (Interview 
Milan, 18 October 1994).
As we will see in the following passage, peaceful demonstrators are seen 
in these cases as the police’s best allies in the face of violence:
"When the Milanese ’social centres’ were protesting in the middle of certain other 
demonstrations, they were marginalized, not by us, but by the other demonstrators 
themselves! There was a clear-cut distinction. There were workers on the one hand, 
and students on the other. No doubt about it. So it’s true that our biggest help - 
because they nevertheless tried to get back into the march, to infiltrate it in various 
ways - were in fact the marshalls of the demonstrators themselves. We didn’t have




























































































to intervene at all. It was the workers themselves who set themselves apart, who 
pushed out the others, because they were saying ‘We have nothing to do with that 
lot’. It has always been one reason why it was right for us not to intervene, in my 
opinion” (Interview Milan, 24 November 1994).
In concrete terms, the common interest is that the "peaceful 
demonstrators" take the head of the march: "If the head of the march is made 
up of peaceful people, whom we can trust, then the march unfolds normally" 
(Interview Milan, 18-19 October 1994).
In contrast, a more negotiated intervention of the police characterizes 
more disruptive protests - road or rail blocks for example - of workers, the 
unemployed, homeless, and so on. In these cases, the police see themselves as 
a mediator who must make a certain visible presence to the protesters, at the 
same time reducing inconveniences for other citizens:
“we try to plan deviations for the traffic, by collaborating with the head of the 
Vigilanza Urbana (traffic squad), we thus try to avoid exactly what the protesters are 
aiming to do - that is paralyse the traffic, create problems for everyone - by blocking 
the traffic coming in one direction or the other, deviating it for a while, creating 
alternative routes around the streets as far as possible” (Interview Milan, 27 December 
1994).
The police, intervening in this case in a “visible” way, often interpose 
themselves to avoid direct conflict between the demonstrators and drivers who 
might try and force their way through the road block. The road block is thus 
tolerated, at least for a period of time judged sufficient to “express” the protest:
"Generally we find a way of mediating. That is, by telling them, ‘OK, we won’t 
intervene, if you’re here for a quarter of an hour, we can tolerate the road block, but 
more than that, I ask you, no!’" (Interview Milan, 18 October 1994).
A third model, which is based on a kind of ritualised stand-off, appears 
to be the dominant approach to protests by the youth clubs associated with the 
autonomous groups. In many of the demonstrations by autonomous groups the 
forces of order are present in numbers judged sufficient to discourage any 
violence. Their equipment is, in general, “combat gear”: with a helmet under the 
arm and baton (just to put the helmet on can in itself be a good means of 
dissuasion). Large cordons are deployed to defend "sensitive targets", and to 
prevent the march deviating from its planned route. As one officer of the 




























































































Police Knowledge and Public Order: Some Reflections on the Italian Case
"With the autonomous groups, it is a question let’s say of maximum attention, ... with 
maximum attention for the number of police officers present in the streets. Everything 
goes calmly, lets say, as far as we’re concerned. However, at the same time, there is 
a certain risk present... You see, you feel, that at any moment something could break 
out. The way of approaching this, generally speaking, is always clear in this case, that 
if they are going past certain parts of the city, public buildings or offices, etc., they 
are all covered by forces of order to avoid them becoming the target of various 
attacks" (Interview Milan, 21 November 1994).
In other cases, however, the presence of the police might be less visible, 
as a way of "calming the mood" of the protest: "Quite often, and voluntarily, it 
is a good idea to hide ourselves. They don’t see us, and so they stay calm. 
Because they see us as the ones who cause trouble" (Interview Milan, 18 October 
1994). As one Florentine official said, emphasizing the presence of a degree of 
"personal" choice6:
"It has happened to me that I have to decide in which circumstances it is more 
appropriate that the forces of order are not too visible ... For example, in the case of 
demonstrations on the streets by autonomous groups. They do not gladly accept a 
stifling or overwhelming police presence. They see it as a provocation, so that when 
we have these demonstrations by autonomous groups, unless they are demonstrations 
that have already proven to be particularly dangerous, when they are quite spontaneous 
demonstrations, we prefer to control these young people in a more indirect way. 
Personally I have always chosen this type of intervention" (Interview Florence, 12 
December 1994).
A fourth model is based on the total isolation of "trouble makers". It 
foresees a complete control over the area at risk and the movement of persons 
considered "dangerous" for public order. The principle application of this model 
of police involvement is during football matches, above all those which involve 
some kind of traditional rivalry between the fans. The police intervention in this 
case is based on a massive investment of energy and resources:
“In my opinion, all in all the situation which creates the most worries for us, from the 
point of view of public order, is the football stadium. In the sense that you get so 
many people at an event like that. In Milan that means 70-80,000 people. In Bergamo, 
30,000. They stay in the stadium, they meet up, they go wherever they want, on the 
underground for example ... for us, for sure, it’s the hardest job we do. It’s the most
6 As already mentioned, the informal character of the negotiation process increases the 






























































































tiring work, it’s the thing that takes the most time, because a day at the stadium begins 
in fact at 8 a.m., with the service that goes to check the inside of the stadium, to see 
if they have hidden any sticks or blunt objects, anything that could be used to hurt the 
opposing fans. That’s 8 in the morning, and the match is at half past three in the 
afternoon. ... We have to meet up, assemble, get our equipment together, set off, etc. 
And sometimes we finish at 8 in the evening. And then maybe there is the escort for 
these people. We have to wait until the train leaves, see that everything is peaceful.... 
Often we are deployed to take the people from the trains. A train arrives - usually it 
would never arrive in the centre of Milan, for security reasons it arrives at Sesto San 
Giovanni, making use of the fact that there is an underground station there - so 
therefore they take the underground, without stopping, and they are accompanied 
directly to the stadium, that is in Piazzale Lotto. Its a kind of special train. The 
journey is quite a long one: 35-40 minutes, with us in helmets standing in the 
underground. Its a heavy situation. Especially the return journey. You’ve already done 
six, seven, eight hours of service. From Piazzale Lotto, we then accompany them all 
the way to the stadium, and there, you often see, not what I would call incidents, but 
forms of impatience by the fans. The match is almost starting, and these people have 
to get there on foot. You want this because our basic aim is to keep them together as 
a group. We can’t afford to let the fans split up into two, because that splits us into 
two as well" (Interview Milan, 18/19 October 1994).
As has been confirmed by our eyewitness observations at the stadium, this 
total isolation is maintained both outside and inside the stadium. Inside the 
stadium, the two groups of fans are kept apart, often by creating open spaces 
(segments of empty stadium seats) that separate the two potential adversaries. In 
our observations, we noticed that police cordons form close to the fans of the 
home team and on the edges of the field. The officers are overtly equipped for 
the defence of public order, with helmets, batons and protective devices. The 
camera unit is also found next to the field. Wherever possible, the fans of the 
visiting team are closed off in a sector of the stadium with high anti-crush 
barriers. The police involvement is designed to prevent contact between the two 
groups of fans, whereas they do not stop the throwing of various types of 
objects (money, plastic bottles full of water and objects taken from the toilets). 
The concern with separating the two groups of fans is also evident outside the 
stadium, both before and after the match. Here, police officers and Carabinieri, 
present in large numbers and equipped for combat duty, collect the fans of the 
visiting team from the railway station and bus stops, surround them with a police 
cordon that closes the group in on all four sides, and escort them to the visitors 
entrance, where the fans have to go through a brief search. At the exit to the 
stadium, the supporters of the visiting team have to wait until their rival home 
fans have been moved on. Before the doors of the guest fans’ section are 




























































































Police Knowledge and Public Order: Some Reflections on the Italian Case
space”, distanced from the spaces where the other fans and onlookers are 
standing. The guest fans are then surrounded by a police cordon once again, and 
reaccompanied to the trains and buses. In the case of the police intervention for 
the Fiorentina vs. Roma match, which we observed at close range, one official 
later explained the reasons for an intervention that was criticized in some 
newspaper commentaries as too “heavy-handed”:
"Here is why we need 1,200 officers, it’s necessary to cover all eventualities. There 
was an escort all the way during the train journey ... On the train there was also the 
escort from Roma which accompanied them all the way to Florence, and here in 
Florence there was a large force of order deployed ... At the end of the match, the 
same thing - in general the technique, even for matches where there is no risk but 
where there is a presence of visiting fans, it’s always the same. First we let out the 
mass of local people (around 25,000 spectators). We wait 15-20 minutes, enough that 
the zone around the stadium begins to clear a bit. After that we do an operation to 
reclaim space with the officers that we have at our disposition, and we ask people to 
move away from the path that has to be made with the opposing fans; then we 
surround them and accompany them to the train or buses. In general, this is the 
technique that we use for operations at the stadium ... In practice, yesterday practically 
half the force was at the stadium, without counting the other officers in the city; 
around 300-350 police officers and as many Carabinieri. Among the police there were 
the Reparlo Mobile of Florence and Naples, because in these cases we often end up 
asking the assistance of cities quite a longway away, perhaps because cities nearby 
might have other commitments" (Interview Florence, 12 December 1994).
1.4. The mediators o f public order
The more "cooperative" the method of control, the more important a 
particular figure becomes: the mediator. The relevance of mediation, underlined 
continually in our interviews, has also been explicitely recognized in the highest 
ranks of the police. For example, in an information note of 7 March 1990, the 
head of police Parisi advised Prefetti and Questori to make "contacts with the 
organizers of the demonstrations in order to ensure that they unfold peacefully", 
suggesting moreover to "direct resources to preventive measures which, 
supported by in-depth analyses and evaluations of the various problems, are 
agreed to contain, through appropriate persuasive actions, potential flashpoints, 
avoiding incidents and limiting direct interventions to concrete cases of danger 
to public order and security, and where there is a need to avoid serious damage 
being done".
Other research on public order in Europe has already stressed the 





























































































demonstrators.7 In Italy as well, the announcement of demonstrations—a formal 
act required at least three days before the demonstration—is followed, in the case 
of the largest ones, by negotiations on the route of the demonstration, its 
duration, and how it will be dispersed. As one interviewee observed,
"For better or worse there is a great deal of work spent on planning, which is all a 
preventive exercise. We pay particular attention, it seems to me, to the route that is 
going to be followed - here I am just talking about political demonstrations, the 
stadium is an altogether different thing ... There is a lot of work done on the route, 
through informal contacts, at the level of ‘we won’t go that way, when you go that 
way’, in the end what’s allowed is a small protest that won’t degenerate further than 
that, there is a lot of work of this kind. There are persons, also on the other side, who 
... make direct contact with our senior officials” (Interview Milan, 24 November 
1994).
The negotiation phase is in fact presented as being oriented towards facilitating 
the realization of common goals: the peaceful unfolding of the demonstration.. 
When the participation of groups considered as a source of potential danger to 
public order is foreseen, the police officials may make an agreement with the 
organizers in order to avoid any escalation. According to one chief officer of the 
Digos:
”... We are also able in some way to give suggestions and ask for clarifications and 
give them help. Undoubtedly we say, look at these people who might create a bloody 
mess, excuse the term, either you isolate them or we’ll have to think about doing it 
ourselves, that is the technique we use. This works every time, because when a sizeable 
part o f the demonstration are workers as they are at the moment, then it is in fact the 
workers who in these big initiatives want everything to go well, otherwise the 
demonstration fails. These days, well, the degeneration o f a demonstration is now seen 
as a failure o f  the demonstration itse lf... you have to isolate the virus" (Interview 
Florence, 14 November 1994, emphasis added).
Differently than in other countries, in Italy however the figure of the 
mediator, although present informelly, has not been institutionalized. It is thus 
a role covered, according to the circumstances, either by the police official who
7 This point on the importance of negotiation for public order is made also by 
Waddington (1996) on Great Britain; Fillieule and Jobard (1996) on France; McCarthy, 
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is directing the operation or by the chief officer of the Digos present at the 
demonstration:
"The Digos is the one who creates the contact. Anything, therefore, can help-for 
example, to stop a particular banner being shown because it is offensive. Before we 
have to arrest him, because then you create tensions, obviously. On the other hand, to 
contact one of the people responsible for the march in order that they follow a certain 
route rather than another because of some surprise factor, it’s the Digos who contacts 
them. Because it is the Digos who knows these things" (Interview Milan, 29 December 
1994).
Again in contrast to the other countries, there is in Italy also a lack of official 
rules, and action is therefore based predominantly on individual initiatives by the 
chief of police. This informelity brings with it a mixing up of roles that can 
have potentially negative effects. As an example, the Digos officials, who are 
responsible for negotiation, are the same ones who press charges; and the official 
of the Questura is the one in charge of possible cases of custody. Contrary to 
the British case, where the formality of the agreement facilitates a certain 
respect, the informal Italian culture may favour an opportunistic approach in 
which, particularly in situations of uncertainty, both parties might be tempted not 
to conform to the agreements they have made.
2. Information work and the control of public order
Dialogue and mediation however are accompanied, in the strategic 
conception of the police, with an important element of “control” of 
demonstrators through the collection of information.8 The strategy that is 
defined as "dialogue" goes hand in hand with the development of certain 
information techniques, in particular those allowing for control at a distance, 
such as television cameras in stadiums and interventions from above with 
helicopters during marches.9 As regards the control of stadiums, one official 
explained:
8 Those interviewed were, however, in general against interventions aimed at 
“outlawing” groups which systematically provoke disorder and incite violence - a solution 
which they judged as counterproductive and anti-democratic.
9 On the influence of technological development on police technique of information 





























































































"We are advising the use of cameras that have tremendously good zoom lenses for all 
sections of the stadium. You can really see a person’s face well, with the possibility 
therefore of photographs and the registration of images at any moment in time. Thus, 
during the match there are two or three permanent operators, we have the chance to 
follow exactly what is happening ... we can fix the image, then we can go and print 
the photo immediately, [trouble makers] can be photographed immediately in ten 
seconds through a Polaroid system ... now in some matches this system with video­
cameras is allowed to be screened on the announcement board that they have at the 
stadium for results and adverts. When they are moments of particular tension or 
brawls, the image is projected on the largest screen. We write on it: the police are 
filming you. Then they can see for themselves that we are filming them and 
underneath it is saying: these images will be taken, and examined as evidence, etc. 
This might also work as a deterrent” (Interview Florence, 12 December 1994).
The gathering of information with audiovisual technology is usable in the 
event that charges are pressed, but it is nevertheless necessary that there are 
interventions prior to crimes being committed, in particular the identification of 
people who may participate in disturbances to public order. As another official 
observed, in the case of the football stadium, this form of control can be 
implemented through keeping records on file of those who buy tickets to follow 
their team in away matches:
"The matches that are particularly at risk are prepared to the minutest detail. As for 
yesterday’s match, there was a not inconsiderable amount of work put in by the 
Questura in Rome. Already from Rome it had been signalled in great detail who were 
the people leaving to come, they had been identified, given tickets - 1 am talking about 
official departures here, some of them come in their own cars. But for those on the 
train and the buses, that is the majority, nearly 1,700 people, they had been identified, 
given tickets and signalled to us. In effect, there was this signal to tell us that those 
on the train were more the hot heads, that those on the buses were predominantly less 
aggressive people" (Interview 12 December 1994).
Because it happens in advance of any crime being committed, this type of police 
intervention cannot be defined as criminal investigation, whilst neither does it 
have the T.aracter of prevention. In the strict sense of the word, it is not 
oriented towards prevention, but rather in order to make repressive action 
possible.
The trend towards an increase in intelligence work, which appears to be 
common to several countries, is summed up in Italy with the peculiar conception 
of the competencies of the Digos, as an information service which operates 
above all in political terms. In distinction from the Squadra Mobile, which has 
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"political" crimes - that is, according to the definition given by its own chief 
officers, of crimes "known to have political ends" - and, in addition to the 
criminal investigations it also have the function of information gathering, for 
which the Digos do not need any authorization from the magistrature before 
undertaking them.10
The "omnipresent" conception of the information-gathering powers of the 
Digos — adapted to collecting information on about all kinds of themes, from 
political parties to trade unions, from questions about social conditions to 
economic ones — is reflected in its organizational structure, with sessions that 
are expected to cover, via the collection of information, all the possible sources 
of social tension, including therefore political ones. For instance, in Milan:
"The Digos is composed of a certain number of sections. Six to be exact. Out of these, 
five are operational and one is concerned with the administration of personnel. The 
first section deals with political parties and trade unions. Then there is a second 
section that deals rather with movements of the radical left, the extreme left. The third 
section is the anti-terrorist section. The fourth section ... deals with movements of the 
extreme right, the radical right, you might say. The fifth section deals with the practice 
of judicial policing” (Interview Milan, 27 December 1994).
The activity of the Digos, in gathering information even about parties and 
movements that are perfectly legitimate, comes to be justified through a 
distinction - that frequently re-emerged in the interviews - between 
“investigating” and “collecting information”. The Digos thus portrays itself as 
a genuinely "epistemological" organ of the state. Its activity reflects a conception 
that has taken root over time, of policing oriented towards the total knowledge 
of a particular territory. On this very theme, the following passage taken from 
an interview with an official of the Milan Digos, is particularly interesting, 
explaining his work as oriented primarily to the gathering of knowledge - and 
identical in some ways to the work of a journalist:
"In practice, we follow events, in a journalistic way, that is with reports and memos, 
and also with research, news that is in advance of that which is given to the public, 
therefore with the same kind of input that a journalist might have. I deal with parties,
10 As far as interventions in demonstrations are concerned, personnel from the Digos 
participate in civilia clothes, and without any official identity badge (whereas any official 
from the Questura doing public order work has to wear the tricolour band), with the only 
constraint that they have to inform the Questura. The presence of plain-clothes officers in 






























































































institutional parties, and the political parties that are now registered, and all the trade 
unions, whether they are the institutionalized ones, Cgil, Cisl, Uil, or the autonomous 
ones, like the Cub. The parties I am responsible for are: the ex-Socialist party, now 
the Socialisti Italiani, Partito Democratico della Sinistra, the Movement for 
Democracy-the Rete, Italia Democratica, that is the last organization founded by 
Nando dalla Chiesa, Alleanza Democratica, Lega Nord, Partito Socialdemocratico 
Italiano, or at least what remains of them, together with the Repubblicani Italiani, or 
what’s left, Rifondazione Comunista, Forza Italia, Centro Cristiano Democratico, 
Partito Popolare. ... The Digos, as part o f a Questura, is a kind o f observatory o f 
Milan and its region in the service o f  the Minister o f the Interior, to know what it is 
going on in the country in substantive terms. So, what do we do, myself or my 
colleagues? We go to find out about these parties. We go and attend meetings of the 
party sections, we try to develop relations with the trade unionists, with the members 
of parliament, with the local secretary, or with the representative of the local area. ...
I go to the branch meetings, I go to the party congress, I present myself as an official 
of the Milan Digos, I tell them who I am, and I am the person who is known to them, 
of course. For them, I am the face of the Questura... My work is often exactly the 
same kind of thing as the work of those who I refer to as my “journalist colleagues”. 
Because we are always the same set of people, in the same environment, who are 
going to meetings of, who can I say, Forza Italia for example. I have had a genuinely 
journalistic interest all along in the Lega Nord and Forza Italia, because 1 saw them 
being created. Out of nothing. Well, I remember when Forza Italia didn’t exist, I 
remember the first promotional materials, the first things that they did, the first 
meetings, because I was already there. They were even asking me to remember the 
first street demonstrations that they held after the political crisis, they asked me advice 
about how to get a march together. Fun things like that. Therefore we have to procure 
these pieces o f  news, on the basis o f which can elaborate a certain body o f knowledge, 
which are then written into reports, and put into memos, and they are no more and 
no less than pieces o f journalism" (Interview Milan, 29 December 1994).
Similar to this, and equally interesting is the image presented by a 
Florentine official, who compares the functions of the Digos to those of a 
research centre:
"One has to distinguish between investigating and collecting information ... because 
we are not gathering secret information, we are rather just following the social and 
political events of the Republic, the same things that you find in the newspapers. 
Obviously if they put information in the newspapers it is of less value to us ... Among 
my tasks is that of securing social, political, cultural activities ... Our activity is about 
making reports on the progress of social, economic, political, and criminal events. 
These are reports that go the Minister, that go to the Prefetto, if there’s no turbulence 
or reasons to worry about something, the Prefetto is not going to have the motive to 
ask for information... You know, we are the information eye o f the Repubblica, 
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purview o f  law and social rules. It’s more a question of putting our finger on what's 
going on with the social and economic situation of the country, it is what the Local 
Office of Employment does on questions that are important to them; I think the 
Chamber of Commerce, I’m not sure if they are the ones who do it, but every now 
and then they also do their own study on the social and economic situation; the Bank 
of Italy makes reports about the lira, I think that it’s the same kind of thing" 
(Interview Florence, 14 November 1994, emphasis added).
Just as the generalized gathering of information thus becomes considered 
a "legitimate" activity, the readiness of people to open themselves up to the 
officials of the Digos comes to be taken in itself as an indication of "good will". 
Closing up to the outside, meanwhile, comes to be seen as suspect, as a wish to 
hide potentially evasive secrets; "Even the fact of not being able to get 
information might be a symptom that perhaps things are not as untroublesome 
as they should be" (Interview 21 November 1994). From this point of view, the 
parties of the left - whether the PDS or the Rifondazione - thanks to their long­
time practice of cooperating with the police and their predictability, come to be 
considered as more easily kept under control than more recent groups, that are 
“suspect”, such as the Lega.
The model of protest policing based on the gathering of information is 
connected more generally to a historical tradition. In Italy, this has created an 
organization of policing which, like in France, has given high priority to the 
collection of information. The development of this activity of information 
gathering requires further explanation. From this point of view, one might 
discuss the hypothesis). The growth in the relevance of information gathering, 
and thus the permanence if not the growth of specialized agencies dealing with 
these tasks, might however also be seen as a consequence of organizational 
dynamics that push them to expand their own functions (for instance, Garret 
1981; Marx 1979). If the Digos, and before it the "political office" of the 
Questura, has thrived even when the political situation becomes less polarized 
and political violence has almost disappeared, this might be explained in part by 
the tendency of organizations to perpetuate themselves over time. There is still 
a third explanation, not necessarily an alternative, that we shall see in Part three: 
the necessity of making the information sector more efficient in order to 





























































































3. Police knowledge about the actors who produce public disorders: bad 
and good demonstrators
Police reactions to demonstrations are linked to the knowledge police have 
about the disturbances, as well as their role and the role that other actors play: 
notably, political power and public opinion. In general, the sociological literature 
on the police emphasizes the diffusion of stereotypes on the origins of disorders, 
and of those who are considered to be responsible for breaking the rules 
(Lipsky, 1970: 4). Some recurrent themes have been singled out in the police 
definition of potential trouble-makers as mainly young, ‘outsiders ’ (immigrants, 
ethnic minority members or ‘agents provocateurs’), deviants and disadvantaged 
socio-economic groups (Lacey, Wells and Meure, 1990: 71). More specific to 
political disorders are the stereotypes related to “conspiratory” theories- such as 
the “masked man”, the “rotten apple”, or the communist agitator (among others, 
McClintock, Normandeau, Robert and Skolnick, 1974, 127-130; also Kettle and 
Hodges, 1982, 20). One of the first questions that we asked ourselves, therefore, 
was whether any of these stereotypes - or others - were held by the leadership 
of the police concerning people who potentially threaten public order. As we 
will see, our research uncovered a different type of classification, which sets up 
a twofold distinction between demonstrators who are either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ by 
nature (for a similar point, Waddington, 1994; Willelms et al., 1988).
The interviewees are in agreement, above all, on an image of profound 
change in the nature of challenges to public order. In the words of one official 
from the Questura of Florence, there has been a qualitative transformation of the 
question of public order:
"There has been a transformation in the kind of people involved, in the sense that the 
problems of public order of the 1970s and early 1980s ... were essentially problems 
linked to political demonstrations: by the Autonomia Operaia (autonomous workers 
union), opposition groups, or extreme right. These were the main focus of concern for 
public order. I would say the underlying themes of protest that were felt so heavily in 
the problems of public order of the 1970s and early 1980s are now much less clear. 
... If we go looking for people who are a dangerous threat to public order nowadays 
they can however be found in the world of sport. ... it is a fact that between the 
problems of the 1970s and those of the 1990s, there has been, as far as I can see, a 
difference in the type of disorders involved, that is the kind of people who participate 
in them. The problems then were essentially connected with political protests of 
‘opposition’, whereas in this period now they are above all connected with sport" 
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The principal actors who create problems for public order are therefore 
not defined according to their ideological beliefs: "It is the stadium, essentially, 
that accounts for 90 per cent of the public order problems that we cover 
generally: which is 80 per cent stadium work, and 20 per cent public 
demonstrations" (Interview Milan, 18-19 October 1994). This distinction involves two 
main differences: one in the motivation of the actors, and the second in the 
degree of their internal organization.
According to a commonly-held perception, today, in contrast to the past 
when political motivations were uppermost, whoever creates problems of public 
order today now does so because they want a fight.
"... Above all, it’s young hooligans who throw themselves into these acts of violence 
for the taste of violence alone. They find an excuse in the stadium, or among the 
immigrants who sell drugs which they are against. But these are only secondary 
justifications. What they want to do is get in a fight either at the stadium or with the 
immigrants" (Interview Florence, 17 November 1994).
The perception prevails therefore of a distinction between "political" protest, 
seen as "positive", and "non-political" protest, seen as "pure acts of vandalism, 
outbursts, violence pure and simple" (Interview Milan, 15-19-27 July 1994). Hooligans 
do not have motives:
"it is the high-risk football matches that really put public order most at risk. There's 
no motive for it. Its just football hooliganism let loose, people going crazy for their 
team, their passion. They go there because they have to. Above all, they enjoy a fight 
with the police. Because they want to challenge us. In other words, they want 
confrontation with public institutions, with the state” (Interview Milan, 21-22 
November 1994, emphasis added).
The lack of "politicization" of public order problems gives rise to 
particular problems, which were referred to frequently in the interviews: the 
difficulty of ‘predicting’ the actions of the crowd. While political motivations, 
with their instrumental logic, are perceived as relatively easy to control, 
irrational hooligans are more difficult to control, precisely because of the lack 
of an understandable logic behind their actions:
"In the 1970s there were many demonstrations, all of them of a political nature - and 
for this reason easy to deal with in an instrumental manner. Whereas, let’s say for 
about ten years now, demonstrations no longer have this kind of nature, they are 





























































































violence, have found a way of releasing their own internal tensions1' (Interview Milan, 
21 November 1994).
Moreover, the control of public order becomes more complex, the less 
there is any structured organization. The control of stadiums, therefore, has, over 
the period during which our interviews were conducted, been rendered more 
difficult by the weakening of the traditional structure of organization of football 
fans. As one interviewee observed:
"If these groups o f  fans come together under a certain flag, or label, under a symbol 
o f some significance, and i f  there are people at the head o f this group who are 
recognized as leaders, let’s just say it all makes our life much easier. If, on the other 
hand, it can be seen, as is the case in recent times - at least this seems to be the 
tendency - that there is a splintering of groups and gangs, our police work becomes 
more difficult. This is because these groups and gangs can move around and hide 
themselves during the course of a season, and you then have difficulties in your police 
operations to stay on top of these continual developments. Whereas when the 
phenomenon was more marked out and more stable, it was much easier fo r us" 
(Interview Milan, 5 December 1994, emphasis added).
This is also true for a second group of trouble-makers, apparently of a 
more political nature. A distinction between disruption that is comprehensible 
and genuine because it is "motivated" and the more dangerous violence that is 
"violence for the fun of it" is also used to distinguish among the politically 
motivated demonstrators, between "good" and "bad" ones (see also P.A.J. 
Waddington 1994: 112-113). The former are above all those who protest their 
own direct interests, often dangerously under threat: workers defending their 
jobs, unemployed people who cannot find work, people who have been evicted 
and cannot find a home, or people who live on a particularly busy and chaotic 
street. The second category, meanwhile, are those who protest about issues that 
do not concern them directly, and themes that are more "abstract" and more 
"instrumentalizable" politically. Protests in the eyes of the police are also seen 
as more legitimate, the more those who participate in them are directly 
concerned with the issue that they are mobilizing around, such as the "workers":
"Nowadays, for the policeman who is involved in the protection of public order, but 
also in other duties, one thing is clear: he can recognize exactly the different kinds of 
people who go on demonstrations - maybe this wasn’t true in the 1960s, but today it 
certainly is. And, I would say on many occasions, faced with people who have lost 
their jobs, and who are protesting in a calm and dignified manner, then there is even 
an emotional involvement with them, that is, we felt close to these people. We were 
there to protect public order because we had been sent there. Therefore, we don’t have 
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occasions people are protesting to safeguard a certain right or their jobs, which is 
essential in order to survive. Nowadays, before we go out on a public order 
assignment, we often have a chat with a public official and in some cases with the 
leaders of the demonstration, during which, therefore, before we go out on service, we 
ask what are the motives and scope of the demonstration. That is to say. we go out 
into service knowing who we are going to meet. We know whether we are going to 
encounter family men in the streets, or people who are likely to cause trouble. We go, 
therefore, already knowing what we are going to encounter" (Interview Milan, 5 
December 1994, emphasis added).
In this case too, the instrumentality of the action gives predictability to the 
actors and pushes them to avoid escalation:
"There is a great deal of tolerance. You see it, above all, in the workers’ marches 
where they are protesting for a just cause, they follow their route and then stage a 
protest at the railway station. Now this is a serious disturbance because the occupation 
of a platform is illegal, but we tolerate it because an intervention at this point would 
really cause some big problems, and would provoke a chain reaction that would be 
uncontrollable. The occupation is just symbolic, they block things for half an hour" 
(Interview Florence, 12 December 1994).
Those who aim at material changes can therefore be relied upon:
"In my experience, every demonstration, unfortunately, is an occasion for groups or 
gangs of people who join in to create trouble. It is clear that workers who come into 
the streets to defend a right to a pay rise, or a right to work, family men, these people 
for sure do not come into the streets with the intention o f creating disorder. But it is 
also clear that in any peaceful demonstration some gangs o f  people try to penetrate 
the demonstration who have an interest in seeing the event degenerate. It is clear that 
in all these cases, ... because we know who they are, it is easy to pick out the people 
who might create a disturbance. This is why we - in this case the official in charge of 
the demonstration - we look to isolate them, these gangs - and in recent times it has 
been the peaceful demonstrators themselves who do this. And if they don’t succeed, 
we look ourselves to isolate them from the peaceful demonstration to stop them 
creating disturbances, which is the way to uphold the right kind of public order" 
(Interview Milan, 11 November 1994, emphasis added).
"Just" motives thus legitimate forms of protest that were once considered 
illegal, through definitions that differentiate specific types of illegality. Thus, 
repeatedly, the officials interviewed underlined the difference between a peaceful 





























































































“When we talk about road blocks, we mean something different: these are when 
people put themselves in the middle of the road to protest, although, if you think about 
it, any demonstration is a kind of road block. No, with these people, what I mean is 
they take the trash can, they throw it down in the middle of the street, they make 
barricades, in that case, we are talking about something that is against the law” 
(Interview Florence, 10 November 1994).
The recognition of a certain legitimacy to a protest permits the justification of 
actions that are more radical, perhaps even involving a certain aggressivity 
towards the police:
"One has to evaluate the mood of the demonstrators: take each case as it comes. For 
sure a demonstration by cassa integrati [people on unemployment benefits] who come 
to carry out illegal acts against the officers who are there to show their presence and 
manage public order - and I don’t just mean acts of violence, but also mention other 
things that are much more widespread, which are generally not pursued, like spitting 
or verbal abuse - now, obviously these things could be pursued, but clearly they are 
made by people who are angry and exasperated, against police officers who are 
certainly not seen as people who are victims of violence, and so for this reason these 
persons ought to be liable to immediate punishment, but it must be seen in a, let’s 
say, wider perspective. That is, because the police officer at that moment has offered 
a service, in a practical sense, in fact a moral service, you might say, that is why we 
must face up to the demands o f the situation, try to tolerate, i f  you like, even the most 
angry demonstrations, because they might be people who have genuine motives for 
this. Certainly, the same behaviour by football fans, or young people who just want 
to provoke us, that’s a standing order, that is certainly a different thing altogether" 
(Interview Milan, 19 November 1994, emphasis added).
Another characteristic of the trade union movement considered in very 
positive terms by police officials is their experience of demonstrations and hence 
their capacity to "control themselves".11 As one of them observed:
"Look, they are always having them. Because it is something that has been handed 
down by tradition. Therefore, when it comes to the workers, for example, 1 won’t 
inclu^'- , l rm [as a public order problem] ... because all they are doing is asking for 
their just rights. The Reparto Mobile goes there, but it just watches, surveys it, because 
it would be very difficult for the force to intervene directly against the workers. We
11 As for the London police, Waddington also noted: "There is little doubt that most 
police genuinely believed that it was mutually advantageous if marchers ‘policed themselves’. 
Indeed, they valued those organizations most that were best able to do so. Thus, trade union 
marches were regarded with something approaching affection, because they were well 
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go there but it’s just for observation reasons, more than anything. For there to be a 
repressive intervention some penal norms must be infringed. But usually, there is no 
intervention with the workers ... the trouble makers today, well, today it’s the workers 
themselves who marginalize them. It’s true, yes, in some demonstrations, you do get 
trouble-makers, but the police in that case ... you look to see if the workers have their 
own marshalls, created by the unions or by themselves, most times they warn the 
police that there are these trouble-makers present. Then, during the route, with their 
own marshalls, they intervene to isolate them. Obviously, in cases where their own 
marshalls can’t manage it, then the police intervene ... But the workers are intelligent 
people" (Interview Milan, 21-22 November 1994).
In contrast, in the case of football fans, the probability that the negotiators 
are committed to valid ends is considered to be particularly unlikely. The 
perception here then is that the opportunity of mediation is something which 
must be earned: whilst it is something that is considered likely to be beneficial 
with the workers, it is however seen as unpromising in other cases. As an other 
official observed, "a dialogue at the stadium is impossible"; "it would be like 
giving some official status to this rabble" (Interview Florence, 12 December 1994).
Not only the workers, however, but even the autonomous protest groups 
(anarchists) of the past - of the 1970s in particular - would now be preferable 
to today’s protesters, according to current police perceptions, because their 
motives were more comprehensible. The following dialogue is highly illustrative: 
an interviewee in Milan criticizes the Leoncavallo Social Centre for “vandalism” 
without a political motive, thereby “rehabilitating” the autonomous groups of 
the 1970s:
"Interviewee: Well, these people really go for it in a big way!!
Interviewer: But didn’t they do as much wanton damage in 1977?
Interviewee: No. No. They were doing it also for political ends.
Interviewer: You mean to say that they are much closer to vandalism nowadays? 
Interviewee: Yes. A lot of them are vandals. And we saw the damage that they did in 
Turati Street!
Interviewer: And what about the damage in 1977?
Interviewee: Well, a few cars were touched, but now they just destroyed things on 
purpose...
Interviewer: All in all then, just to understand you clearly, would you say with respect 
to 10 September [a demonstration of the Autonomous groups in Milan] that these 
conflicts in the streets are more or less alarming nowadays?
Interviewee: Certainly not less. Because they can degenerate all the way, to completely 






























































































This point of view is confirmed in another interview, in which the 
"preference" for the autonomous groups of the past is explained by the fact that 
they had higher "ideals":
"Because there is censorship going on. With these autonomous groups these days - we 
might even ask whether they really are ‘autonomous groups’, because I used to know 
the autonomous groups of the past. And I know these people we have now. And in my 
opinion, they are two completely distinct and separate things, for generational and 
ideological reasons: once these people used to put themselves personally at risk and 
weren’t afraid to put themselves at risk. They weren’t afraid to go and take 
responsibility for their actions before the state which they considered to be the 
principal target of their action. Yet they were people that had a strong idea o f social 
justice, even i f  they were perfect delinquents, by God! These others, however, l think 
o f them more as hooligans. The hooliganism of the football stadium, that’s what it is. 
Their political ideology is purely nostalgic, because they have to prove something, I 
say. But they are completely anachronistic. In contrast, the autonomous groups o f  the 
past, they were an integral part o f  society, because they were a movement that had 
very precise demands, it was something completely different. There was also a 
worker's movement that was particularly active at the time... A lot o f the people in 
the autonomous groups were people who would then go o ff to work in a factory. Some 
o f them were also university students ... What they were talking about, effectively, 
were values. They wanted to make a revolution! Completely wrong-headed, but at least 
they were talking about something concrete. ... Nowadays, why do you think these 
people talk about social centres? Because it’s a business, that’s why!" (Interview 
Milan, 24 November 1994, emphasis added).
So too, for the "radicals" of the Left and the Right experience with 
demonstrations and self-organization is considered in general as an advantage in 
the control of public order. As far as the left-wing militants of the Autonomia 
are concerned, for instance, having now almost a nostalgia for the past - the 
days when public order problems were caused by actors who at least had 
‘comprehensible’ end-goals - the interviewees underline the difficulties that 
derive from an "unorganized" violence:
"Nowadays we do have difficult problems to face, and they are caused by exactly the 
same political fringes which are sprouting again; that is today, there is a return of the 
kind of violence that was always characteristic of the political extremes of left and 
right, but whilst before these people also followed a doctrine, their violence was 
organized, nowadays there is no longer this organization, there is no longer a school 
where they learn like anyone else how to exercise violence. Violence today, therefore, 
can break out in isolated episodes, which are very violent, however, because sometimes 
not even they understand why it is happening... When they don’t have that school for 
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violent’, more often than not, they don't control the violence that they set off, which 
is therefore an unpredictable violence. That is, a group that comes out into the streets 
nowadays might immediately use means and arms that we are not expecting, and we. 
are therefore unprepared in the face of this kind of violence... Less organized groups 
are more difficult to manage: the best example o f  all that l  have been saying is 
violence in the stadium, which is really very hard to handle" (Interview Florence, 28 
November 1994, emphasis added).
For instance, about the Leoncavallo Social Centre, a place often at the 
heart of heated arguments in Milan, an interviewee significantly observed: "They 
don't give us great worries except for the fact that they are unpredictable. 
Sometimes they come out into the streets with aggressive ideas, other times they 
just present themselves as regular political actors and nothing else" (Interview 
Milan, 17 October 1994, emphasis added). The search for an accommodating 
“solution”, also seems to respond to this need for "predictability" about the 
localization and activity of the group: ’I don’t have a prejudice of the kind:
‘As far as I’m concerned we should just throw them out’. Because it seems to me that 
i f  we throw them out o f every place, we will never resolve the problem. Instead, it 
would be sensible, because there is a need for it, to give them a place, and that there 
are precise rules given to them" (Interview Milan, 24 November 1994, emphasis 
added).
The same is true for the radical—and even, paradoxically—the "moderate" 
of the Right. Even here, in fact, the "experience" of organizing demonstrations 
is considered to be a “positive point”, whilst inexperience is seen as a 
forewarning of problems to come. As an example, the following interviewee 
from Milan underlined the risks associated with new political groups on the 
scene, who do not have such experience:
"The danger today, however, is something else, and it is more serious in my opinion. 
Because for us, now, when Forza Italia come out into the streets, and the Alleanza 
Nazionale also come, we certainly are not relaxed about this! Because paradoxically 
these people are more violent than others! These people have not been out protesting 
in the streets before, or in the case of the Alleanza Nazionale, they were suppressed 
for many years, and we don't know what kind of reaction they might have. 
Sometimes, we have seen a youngster walking his dog wearing kefta [a symbol of the 
radical left], and I can’t tell you the insults that I have heard! You wouldn’t get that 
in even the most heated left-wing protests, you understand? Therefore, there is a 
danger with these new groups, with people who are not very manageable, because 





























































































away and start shouting insults" (Interview Milan, 29 December 1994, emphasis 
added).
In this case as well, "predictability" comes to be considered as an element 
that facilitates strategies of control. Knowledge itself about the group permits a 
form of control linked to the "understanding" of objectives, an understanding 
that is lost before the "stranger", that is, autonomous groups that come from 
elsewhere. For example, on the question of the disturbances that broke out 
during the demonstration by social centres in Milan in September 1994, one 
vice-commissioner of the Reparto Mobile observed:
"[the September demonstration] in my opinion was a completely anomalous event, 
perhaps due to the fact that there were many autonomous group members who came 
from outside Milan. 1 am convinced about this, they were people who had nothing to 
lose" (Interview Milan, 18-19 October 19, italics added).
As we shall see in the following section, this "depoliticized" image of the 
actors who create public order problems is accompanied by a tendency to limit 
the competences of the police, a fact that underlines the "social" nature of the 
problems that produce disturbances and the limits of responsibility of the police 
forces in confronting them.
4. The conception of the role of the police: police of the citizens or police of 
the King?
The strategic choice about protest policing is related not only to the image 
of demonstrators, but also to police self-understanding of their role. In general, 
the police tend to present themselves as a neutral actor, constrained by the law. 
Their stratedy depends, therefore, upon external circumstances. For instance, the 
above-mentioned distinction between "good demonstrators" and "bad 
demonstrators" pushes away - at least explicitly - any reflection on the causes 
of possible escalations, giving priority instead to a reactive vision of public 
order, where tactics should derive directly from the nature of the problem of 
public order instead of being seen as perhaps also contributing to creating 
them.12 An intervention by the police would in fact be, in the terms of an
12 As one official observed, "in the 1970s there were not any of these big spaces for 
mediation between the police force and the demonstrators, during the demonstrations by the 
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interviewee, "the antibody against the virus that has been introduced" (Interview 
Florence, 14 November 1994). As we have seen, however, the police have a high 
degree of discretion in the use of their power. In particular, the strategy that has 
here been defined as that of "dialogue" tends to increase the discretionary power 
of the police. This can represent a problem given that the police base their own 
legitimacy on the mere application of the law. As we will see, the form of 
control put into effect through the gathering of information allows them to 
resolve the dilemma between "the application of the law" and “the maintenance 
of peace”; that is, between pursuing violations and guaranteeing the safety and 
security of citizens in everyday situations.
In historical studies of the police one can trace two main lines of thought, 
more or less opposed to each another: one sees the police as a body created from 
below, or by civil society; the other as a body created from above, by rulers. 
Both of these conceptions have some basis in history. In the creation of the 
police, the requests for security and protection by the citizenry were certainly 
important - above all by those who were not rich enough to be able to buy these 
goods on the private market. On the other hand, the institutionalization of the 
police as a function of the state was linked above all to moments of social 
tension, in which the state needed an instrument in order to impose respect for 
its laws, even on those social classes and organizations that did not recognize 
themselves as under its rule. During the evolution of the police, the two 
functions of defending the citizens and the order of the state have also been tied 
up with one another, with a fluctuating dominance of one or the other according 
to different phases of history. The combination of the two functions creates a 
dilemma for the police, given that the defence of political order often alienates 
the sympathy of a good part of the citizenry, and this in turn undermines the 
police capacity to fight criminality.
To each of the two models, or functions, there correspond two modes of 
self-legitimation: a political legitimation in the first case, a social legitimation 
in the second. Conceptualizations of the role of the police oscillate between the 
two poles of being a state police (Staatspolizei), or being a people’s police 
(Biirgerpolizei), who do not defend the government but the constitution. In Italy, 
ever since the formal creation of the police, the conception of being a "state 
police" - a function of the government - has dominated. Even in the 
reconstitution of the police in the proclamation of the Republic, the prerogative





























































































of public order and political control prevailed over the fight against criminality 
and service to the public (Canosa, 1976). Various documents (for example, 
Fedeli, 1981, and Medici, 1979) indeed portray a police isolated from the 
population and close to political power. From the 1970s onwards, nevertheless, 
there seemed to be a tacit emergence within the police of a larger consideration 
for the opposite conception of policing, for a social vision of the police. In 
particular, the struggle against terrorism, seen as a national emergency, and the 
progressive legitimation of the political opposition contributed to a process of 
legitimation “from below” of the police. In the words of one interviewee:
"Nowadays the police are democratic, aware and conscientious. There is an internal 
culture that many years ago didn’t exist. The Questore was an eternal father figure. 
Now, he is a civil servant like the rest of us, a high-ranking official with certain 
responsibilities. The mentality of the absolute, authority figure has been lost, it’s 
absolutely right that we are here in the service of everybody ... now, there’s more of 
a consensus, we are well integrated” (Interview Florence, 28 November 1994).
In some of the interviews, a self-definition of the police as "citizens" and 
"defenders" of the citizenry has emerged:
"In definitive terms, we work for the citizens, we are in the service of the government, 
but not the powerful in society as much but the people as a whole. As the ex-chief of 
police used to say, we are “people among the people”, for which it is right that the 
citizens are kept informed about police activities" (Interview Milan, 17 October 1994).
Or again:
"We are a full part of the social fabric. We are citizens and police officers. Personally, 
I consider myself a citizen first, and a police officer next. But I find myself to be 
completely member of society. Because it’s true that if something isn’t right... I have 
participated in torchlight processions, in completely legal things like that, completely 
above board, because it cannot be otherwise, which is why I am not ashamed to go 
out in the streets to demonstrate my disagreement for something in civil and 
democratic terms. Because I am also allowed to do this. You don’t get this kind of 
guarantee from the army, in my opinion" (Interview Milan, 24 November 1994).
From this point of view, a profound break in the practices of public order 
can be noted, connected with the passage between the 1950s/l960s and the 
1970s/1980s: the end of sharp conflicts with the workers. As will be seen better 
in the following passage, the picture often presented in our interviews is that, up 
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"As far as I’m concerned, from the point of social relations, for certain, the 1960s 
with all the battles in the streets and the killing of people, of demonstrators, we 
arrived at the lowpoint o f relations between the people and the forces o f order, who 
were thus seen in a negative way, as i f  they were operating with an iron fist, let’s say. 
This, particularly in Emilia, and the North, was felt as a real problem. To succeed 
following this in reestablishing contact with the people was the motive behind trying 
to give back to the police ... let’s just say, the police over time looked to give itself 
some internal order. At the internal level there was the changes of 1981, practically 
speaking, with the reform of the police, in which we tried to recreate, to found what 
were the basics of police work and its activities, looking to pursue more concrete 
activities, more in the social context, to go in the opposite direction and try and make 
the people understand that the point of police operations is that it is a service, 
developed to manage and guarantee certain values, such as individual liberty" 
(Interview Milan, 19 November 1994, emphasis added).
The principal turning point was in fact singled out in the 1980s, with the 
police and union reform. In the police perceptions, one of the most important 
effects of this reform was the rapprochement of the citizens and police, and the 
resolution of those tensions that, in the eyes of many of those interviewed, were 
connected to the past “tough” interventions in defence of public order.
This type of legitimation seems to have acquired a growing importance 
in the 1980s, as political corruption accentuated discontent with the political 
parties. The chiefs of the police seem to have given a growing importance to 
their role as mediators between the citizens and public administrators. The 
relevance attributed to this function is connected to the fact that problems which 
create disturbances to public order are defined as social problems, whose 
solution is the duty of the political authorities to address.13 This rule of thumb 
is valid for all kinds of situations, from squatting to road blocks. For example:
"The clearing away of an illegal squat is a social problem. When we find ourselves 
faced with a public order situation where instead of ten evicted people we find two 
hundred of them in the middle of the stieet, supported by other people, before we get 
into a conflict with them, we have to try to solve the problem in the best way by also 
using the intervention of social and political authorities" (Interview Florence, 14 
November 1994).
13 The need to provide the authorities with the information needed in order to "solve 
social problems" also provided a rationale for police preventive work in the past history of 





























































































The taking on of this role of mediator14 seems now to be a police routine in the 
control of public order:
"in certain cases - when for example demonstrators say that they want to speak with 
councillor so and so - in effect, we undertake this task through our own channels, we 
contact the secretary of these political figures and tell them that they have asked for 
them to get involved. Ninety per cent of the time they come, sometimes they don’t" 
(Interview Florence, 12 December 1994).
Recognizing the social dimension of the problem, the interaction of between the 
police and demonstrators is bound up with interaction with (and between) other 
actors.
The leadership of the police seems to be distancing itself therefore from 
a restricted conception of its role as an agent of “reaction” by which the police 
ought to limit themselves to intervening when the law is violated in order to 
control disorders, and moving towards a “proactive” conception of policing for 
which the police should be an agency of public service, with a strong role social 
control role, and perhaps also the responsibility to intervene in the causes of 
criminality. This second conception, however, faces problems of legitimation. 
In a similar way to the magistrature, the police in fact ordinarily legitimate their 
role as a “technical” activity of application of the law. Yet to pass from a 
reactive conception to a proactive one increases the perception that they have 
complete discretion over their own powers of intervention. And, if the police 
have discretionary powers of intervention, the problem of their legitimation and - 
control - is posed in a new form. A management of public order based on 
“dialogue” and “mediation” poses the problem of how to legitimate their own 
choices.
One way of facing this problem, common to our interviews, is by denying 
that there are discretionary choices for the police in relation to the pursuing or 
not of those who commit crimes. Within the scope of the role of the police, in 
fact, the pressing of charges in front of the magistrate of those who violate the 
law during a demonstration allows them to reconcile the dilemma between “law 
enforcement and “peace-keeping”. As the following situation illustrates, the 
lack of “coercive intervention” and the growth of attention to the question of 
control that allows them to press charges with the magistrature are closely 
connected:
14 By mediating with the political authorities, the police enter into a strategy of mutual 
exchanges with the demonstrators: “By doing favors, they expected organizers to offer 
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"We find ourselves constrained to tolerate certain violations, obviously those that are 
of minor importance. If there are serious and really important violations we couldn't 
do anything except intervene, but sometimes because we don’t want to ruin the 
relationship we have with certain demonstrators, some violations will be condoned. 
This doesn’t mean, however, that those responsible for these acts will not be 
punished, that is we decide to not intervene at that moment but the plain-clothes men 
who have the task of individuating and putting their hands on certain people they have 
seen breaking certain laws, during the demonstration whether it’s the plain-clothes 
men of the Digos or the scientific police who have cameras or disguised video 
recorders ... and record these particular moments and minor violations. Once these 
films have been taken, and with the help of these plain-clothes officers, whose job is 
this collection of information - to probe the situation and find out who these people 
are - once the demonstration is over, the plain-clothes officers make a report in which 
they say in effect that they saw so and so write offensive words on a wall, and these 
are minor offences, or that they defaced the door of the Prefettura with paint, then 
they can have charges pressed without any problems" (Interview Florence, 12 
December 1994).
The activity of gathering information and investigation serves then to 
resolve the dilemmas between avoiding disturbances and applying the law - a 
dilemma all the more amplified by the fact that according to Article 55 of the 
Codice di Procedura Penale (Penal Code), failure of a police officer to press 
charges amounts to a crime of non-fulfilment of one’s duty as a public official.
"Immortalize them and identify them" - in the words of this interviewee - allow the 
police to pursue a crime, even if not at the moment it is actually committed. This in 
fact gives support to the belief that "it is only a matter of time before we go after the 
criminal. The problem is when it [the crime] is going to be pursued. If we postpone, 
but only postpone, and not rule out entirely a repressive type of intervention, it can 
be useful to avoid unnecessary disturbances, or more serious disorder, so then it is 
always advisable to avoid a direct intervention as such. But it’s only a question of 
postponing it, avoiding doing it then and there" (Interview Milan, 27 December 1994).
This model of control based on not making an immediate coercive 
intervention, together with the gathering of information that allows charges to 
be pressed with the magistrature, is an explicitly strategic choice, that is 
reproduced through training and instruction at police school.15 As one young 
officer of the Milanese Reparto Mobile recalls:
15 The role of training in the diffusion of the protest policing style is emphasized by 
McCarthy, McPhail and Schweingruber (1996). Martin Winter (1996) suggests that this choice 





























































































"They trained us to not repress all violations of the law during the demonstration, 
that’s right, not in public. Various instructors on public order told us that to repress 
a violation of the law during a demonstration at which there are thousands of people 
present can cause the whole situation to degenerate. During the course, we followed 
a programme that was designed by the Higher Police Institute, in which ... there were 
a certain number of hours dedicated to the question of public order. On this subject, 
during the course on public order, it was in fact a great surprise and very confusing 
to learn that during demonstrations in which thousands or tens of thousands of people 
are converging on a certain street or square, it was absolutely forbidden to the police 
force to intervene in order to suppress open violations of the law, and when this also 
means that they are committing a crime, therefore a violation of a penal norm which 
has a certain punishment attached to it, that would be enough for the police to adopt 
methods to enforce an arrest. In these cases, in order to prevent the demonstration 
degenerating, the chief of service, the chief of the section in charge of the operation 
in the square, will have to look for these violent individuals, the people who are 
breaking the law, by identifying them so that we can pick them later, instead of 
intervening then and there. Identify them perhaps with the help of the scientific police, 
with the right equipment, video cameras, and that kind of thing, individuate the people 
who are the authors of crimes, and look to arrest them later on, when the 
demonstration is over, perhaps when these people go home after they have been filmed 
by the helicopter or cameras or video recorder... All this to avoid the possibility that, 
in trying to stop a crime on the spot, you create a much more serious disturbance, that 
might cause a situation that gets out of control ... Above all, in order to avoid causing 
the demonstration to degenerate, to avoid more serious disturbances o f public order, 
violations o f the law are not repressed at the moment they happen. They will be dealt 
with later on. Perhaps with the help of a specialized unit like the Digos, the scientific 
police, who with the means at their disposal can, later on, identify the authors of the 
crime. We know that that’s how things are going to be handled: even if there is a 
crime committed, we defer to the officials of the Questura, to the chief of the 
Questura about how the police service should be organized” (Interview Milan, 10-11 
October 1994, emphasis added).
Subsequent, training is oriented towards reinforcing these instructions 
given during the police course.
5. The police and the political power
There is always a close connection between the police and political power. 
The function of the police can be defined in fact by the situation "when, within 
a community that has the characteristics of a coherent society, certain of the 
most important aspects of its internal control are taken on by one or more 
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collective grouping and have the possibility of using physical force in order to 
achieve these ends" (Loubet del Bayle, 1992: 20). The police force is one such 
institution, legitimately endowed with the powers to enforce respect for the laws 
of the state. Nevertheless, the police may be more or less dependent on the 
ruling political powers: to return to the discussion developed above, they may 
define themselves as the "King’s police" or the "people’s police". And in fact, 
as Wisler and Kriesi (1996) documented, the political power often intervenes in 
the strategic choice on law and order.16
Whilst in Italy various studies have documented the long dominance of 
the first conception over the latter (amongst others, Canosa, 1976), our 
interviews have put into clear relief the important role that is still attributed to 
the ruling political powers in making decisions about which styles to privilege 
in the maintenance of public order. To cite just one example, concerning the 
decision to intervene in a public demonstration, an official of the Questura of 
Florence observed:
"It depends a lot on the orders that come from above ... The centre of these powers 
is political, the Minister responsible, the chief of the police and the Minister are 
together on this, on these questions they are always closely connected, they keep one 
another informed ... We get the information on the frontline; and then the Questore 
relays what the situation is, he is the carrier of information, which means to say that 
it makes known what is happening on the ground, that for example in Florence a week 
from now the workers from Flantarex are going to occupy the motorway. And so he 
then asks the Minister what to do: do we keep the motorway closed for an hour, with 
the repercussions that that can have nationally on traffic, or do we instead break them 
up immediately?" (Interview Florence, 28 November 1994).
According to the widespread perception held by the police, decisions are taken 
by the ruling political powers and the police’s role is therefore one of 
“applying” them. Contrary to the theory that insists on the natural tendency of 
organizations to enlarge the range of their own influence, our interviews offered 
evidence of an opposite tendency: “to delimit the sphere of influence” 
concerning interventions by the police. The propensity of the political powers 
to transform social problems into “public order problems” was in fact frequently 
stigmatized in our interviews. In these cases, the explicit or implicit criticism of 
the political authorities is that of not fulfilling the duties that rightfully belong 
with the politicians’, putting the police in the difficult situation of having to





























































































carry out a forceful intervention instead. As a chief of the Questura in Florence 
observed:
"There is a tendency to try to heap onto the problem o f public order big issues that 
in my opinion have little to do with public order questions. For example, to talk about 
these Senegalese and so-called 'vu ' cumpra' who sell necklaces in the street in terms 
of public order - since it is said they create tensions in the shopping centres of towns, 
all of which can reverberate onto the general question of public order ... It’s an 
argument that very often is used to push the responsibility for these things directly 
onto those who, by law, have responsibility for the maintenance of public order, that 
is the Questore and Prefetto. It’s a response that can work sometimes, but it also 
entails giving the responsibility for all kinds of public interventions to the police force. 
And to always invoke public order means passing over many o f the means that 
logically and by law ought to deal with certain problems, putting the responsibility to 
intervene instead on the shoulders o f the police, imputing it directly to the Questore 
and Prefetto - the Prefetto, because he is the local ‘political’ authority for public 
security, and the Questore for his technical powers. It’s in this way that, in Florence, 
people have tried to argue about the question of Senegalese or other situations 
involving ethnic groups in terms of public order, but these ethnic minority groups, or 
gypsies haven’t created problems for public order" (Interview Florence, 10 November 
1994, emphasis added).
The same point of view is given by the director of the research institute 
of the police union SIULP, this time concerning prostitution by the so-called 
"Viados", that is prostitutes from Latin America:
"I would not like the fundamental problem to become the question of black prostitutes. 
O f course, it is a problem, but the problem is about how to formulate an answer to 
everything in political terms. But it seems to me that in the meantime, at the political 
level, the issue has become a means for some people to make political capital because 
they have nothing else to say. And so they push everything into a question about 
public order! Because this always grabs the public’s attention. And this, /  believe, is 
a mistaken attitude for politicians to take. ... I f  you want to face up to the problem o f 
illegal immigrants, which was one o f the issues in the electoral campaign, i f  you want 
to tackle the problem, you can’t say the problem is only one for the police force 
alone. To think about reducing the problem o f the "viados " or black prostitution to 
a policing problem alone is a fundamental mistake!" (Interview Milan, 22 September 
1994, emphasis added).
To summarize, it appears that the Italian police emphasize high levels of 
dependence on those in political power. Although a certain degree of autonomy 
does exist— intervention of the political authorities occurs for only a small 
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police provide the information on which decisions are taken-the image of the 
police role as merely applying political directives serves to maintain a self­
legitimation as a neutral actor. From this point of view, we would say that even 
the hypotheses about direct police intervention being a source of “excitement” 
for police officers in contrast to the monotony of everyday activities, has not 
been confirmed, at least at the level of the police leadership (for instance, 
Reiner, 1982; McCabe and Wallington, 19CS: 43). On the contrary, the need for 
legitimation causes police officers to limit the definition of their own tasks and 
duties, as they also look to avoid an overloading of problems they are called on 
to face.
6. The police and public opinion
The image of a total separation of functions, with an absence of 
discretionary powers for the police, is too far from reality to be taken as the 
only guide to the truth. Even though it was often not made explicitly, our 
interviewees did give a place in their discussions to the role that anticipating the 
reaction of public opinion has in the choice of strategies taken by the police 
leadership. For instance, the growing tolerance in police interventions seems also 
related to the perception that the public opinion would criticize police behaviour 
if an escalation should occur. According to a chief officer of the Digos in Milan:
"Nowadays, the perception of things has changed. Why? Because, lets say, culture has 
also changed, which means that we don't want to see violence any more, the state 
now tries to avoid getting into physical conflicts with demonstrators, but instead tries 
to have control of the demonstrators" (Interview Milan, 15-19-27 July 1994, emphasis 
added). According to one official with considerable experience in the management of 
public order police response take into account "who is creating a problem for public 
order. I would take it as important that you cannot adopt the same coercive methods 
if, for example, the Union o f Blind People goes out into the streets and someone then 
starts behaving strangely, compared with 2,000 Lazio fans who arrive as an organized 
group on a train... You have to think about public opinion. This is what we saw in 
[the Neo-nazi demonstration in] Vicenza. There wasn’t anything that happened there 
that disturbed public order in a technical sense, yet public opinion quite rightly said: 
‘What’s going on? These people can go out on the streets and demonstrate without 
being stopped’ - and this was a controversy caused by the lack of action taken" 
(Interview Florence, 10 November 1994).
As emerges from this interview, the police therefore feel constantly "under 





























































































"We respond one way or another according to whether there is a decision to intervene 
or not intervene; in the first case people ask why didn’t you intervene, in the second 
case, they ask why did you intervene if you could have contained what was going on?" 
(Interview Florence, 28 November 1994).
It is interesting to note that, in general, the less "political" the actor 
causing public disorder is, the stronger the perceived pressure on the police to 
"intervene":
"At the stadium, so often we hear people say ‘Look what’s happening over there! Go 
get involved! Intervene!’. This is because of the discourse that we made before so 
many times that it is better to not intervene than intervene ... so many times you hear 
‘isolate the trouble-makers’, ‘throw them out of the stadium’... In a demonstration, 
this is more difficult, but at the stadium I’ve heard them say this. Many times. 
Perhaps they want to see more decisive action on our part. And maybe criticize us 
later on for that" (Interview Milan, 18-19 October 1994).
According to widely-held opinions, the control effected by public opinion 
is achieved through the intervention of the mass media.17
"Public opinion is neither deaf nor blind. The citizens are people who face their own 
problems with public order and so you can’t hope that the press won’t see or hear 
anything. So then you have to weigh up the fact that certain interventions might even 
get you on to Japanese television - for example, what happened in Vicenza, they even 
showed it on the TV news in Germany. While if I start beating up the Jewish 
community during their march, well probably I’ll be on the air in Tel Aviv" 
(Interview Florence, 10 November 1994).
Among the positive aspects of the media presence, the capacity of the 
media to soothe the mood of the "good" demonstrators, offering them a channel 
of communication for their own demands, was stressed. In the press and 
indirectly in public opinion, the very important role of protest in the political 
process is indeed recognised. “Good” demonstrators, even when they cause 
certain disturbances to public order, do so because they want to make a certain 
audience aware of their problems, thus exerting pressure on the ruling powers. 
The presence of journalists, another set of actors who mediate between police 
and demonstrators, has the immediate effect of giving the protest a certain 
visibility - given that "in the end all these people here are interested in is the
17 On the relationships between media, protestors and the police, see, among others, 
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photographer arriving, or that the television people arrive, they make their 
interview or their photos, then they pack up and go home" (Interview Milan, 24 
November 1994). Indeed, concerning the presence of the press, it has been 
observed that:
"Sometimes the people who protest, the people who want to demonstrate, look above 
all, as we know, for a way to make public opinion aware of their own particular 
problems. The fact that there is the press in certain cases is very useful, because angry 
people - and I have very good reason to remember this - when they are interviewed, 
filmed and attract the attention o f the media, they begin to calm down because their 
goals have then already been attained" (Interview Florence, 12 December 1994, 
emphasis added).
A principle problem connected with the presence of the press seems to be 
the need for high levels of self control on the part of the police. To end up 
appearing on the television news or in the newspapers because of a public order 
intervention not only risks losing the public’s sympathy, as we have already 
pointed out, but also increases the probability of creating what the literature on 
the police defines as “on-the-job-troubles”, that is problems linked to political 
and administrative investigations into their behaviour:18
"There are things that we do, or certain mistaken interventions ordered by chiefs, that 
get censured by the administration. When we manage to contain a public order 
problem, well then when public order is protected that isn’t much of a news item. 
When on the other hand public order is not maintained, either through some fault of 
our own or because the intentions of the protest are particularly extreme, in these 
cases, if there are brawls, clashes, violence, in these cases then not only is it going to 
be in the press, but it will end up in a ministerial inquiry, it will end up with the 
political parties making parliamentary and ministerial interventions. There are always 
further consequences. There are always inquiries, that go this way or that way, that say 
you did right or you did wrong. It’s all part of the duties of public order maintenance" 
(Interview Florence, 28 November 1994).
Especially when "political" demonstrators are involved, the police 
acknowledge in fact a particular potential of "on-the-job-troubles". As 
Waddington observed, "Protesters were regarded as archetypal ‘challengers’ or 
‘assholes’, that is people who are difficult to control because they are vocally
18 As Waddington observed in his research on the policing of public order by the London 
Metropolitan Police: "Arrests were regarded by the police as the last resort, for they risked 





























































































knowledgeable of their roles. They were seen as having influential supporters 
amongst journalists, campaigners and MPs, who would join in protesting about 
any police action that might have been construed as infringing freedom of 
speech" (1994: 51). Accordingly, Waddington concludes, "Whereas the police 
exercised power over protesters, others exercised power over them. It was the 
capacity to threaten or create on-the-job troubles that constrained police action" 
(Ibid.: 201). From this point of view, our research seems to confirm in the 
Italian case the widespread perception of the press as a filter between the police 
and citizens - and therefore the importance of enjoying "good press", given that 
"if the citizen doesn’t have faith in the police force, they won’t even turn to us 
when they need us" (Interview Milan, 11 November 1994).
An increased pluralism of information has accentuated the risks for the 
police of finding themselves the subject of criticism:
"Nothing has changed, if not certain methods, certain things are a bit different now 
because now, for sure, there are more journalists involved, the television, the mass 
media in general, whereas before only one television channel participated, the RAI. 
Now there are dozens of these private television channels who come to these big 
demonstrations. There also we have to be careful, it’s better there to keep control and 
avoid things getting out of hand" (Interview Milan, 15-19-27 July 1994).
Even though it is often hidden behind the idea of "do your duty and don’t mind 
the journalists", it in fact emerges that the awereness of the negative effects of 
“tough” interventions over public order, filmed by the mass media, may well 
have an effect on the image of the police in the eyes of the citizenry.
7. Summary
The object of this study has been to reconstruct some of the aspects of police 
knowledge relative to the control of public order. As we observed in the first 
and second pane of this working paper, the strategy used during the course of 
the 1980s and to date in our research, appears to be dominated by three 
principles: avoid coercive intervention as much as possible, mediate and perfect 
the instruments for information gathering. This strategy, not dissimilar to the one 
adopted by other police forces in continental Europe, differs however in that the 
practice of negotiation remains rather informal. Another characteristic of the 
Italian case is the weak presence of limits and controls on the activity of 
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“epistemological” organ of the state, given its role of collecting information on 
all the political actors and interest groups, and having a special direct 
relationship with the government. Within this general sketch, we then 
distinguished four models of control of public order: a model of cooperation, 
based on a collaboration between the police force and demonstrators, and an 
inconspicuous police presence; a model of negotiation, based on a more active 
presence by the police, with the objective of mediating between the 
demonstrators and “non-demonstrators” who suffer the disruptive effects of 
protests; a model of ritualistic stand-off, based on a more “aggressive” police 
presence, but often at a distance; and a model of total control, based on a 
massive presence and close involvement of the police forces. The principal 
example of the application of the first model is the large trade union 
demonstrations: of the second, direct action by unemployed or homeless people; 
of the third, demonstrations by the youth social centres: and of the fourth, the 
control of football fans.
In the third part, we looked at the effects on the strategic choices of the 
police of their knowledge concerning the actors who cause disturbances. On this 
question, two tendencies emerged. Firstly, the principle actors who provoke 
disorders in the 1990s are, according to a widespread perception of the police, 
actors who are moved not by political motives which are considered to be 
“noble” ends, but by an impulse for “hooliganism”, that reflects social problems. 
These actors are identified principally with the ‘ultra’ football fans, to which a 
good part of the activities of the police’s Reparto Mobile is dedicated. Secondly, 
we observed a distinction between "good" demonstrators, who protest with ends 
that are understandable, and "bad" demonstrators, whose objectives appear to be 
more confused. Among the former category are “workers”, or “family men” - 
according to the definitions of those interviewed - who demonstrate in defence 
of their jobs or union claims, and who have both long experience of 
demonstrations and a noteworthy capacity of "self-control". Among the second 
category, are the young people from social centres, whose demands are 
considered at best to be “confused”, and whose behaviour often appears to be 
"unpredictable".
Moreover, we argued that these strategies are a function not only of the 
images the police have of the actors involved in a protest, but also of those they 
have of other social actors considered to be relevant to the question of public 
order: the police themselves (Part 4), political power (Part 5), and public opinion 





























































































we noted the adoption of strategies of "containment" - implying a considerable 
“underenforcement” of the law - which also bring with them problems of 
legitimation. Officially, the police justify their role as being merely one of 
"technical" application of the law. The "non-application" of the law when 
strategies of non-coercive control of public order are used brings with it the 
recognition of their discretionary powers, which negates the image of law 
enforcement as being purely technical. The development of technical means for 
gathering information serves to "negate" the existence of a discretionary power, 
through the subsequent pressing of charges to the magistrature of crimes. We 
found, moreover, a growing search by the police for legitimation in the eyes of 
the public. Alongside the acceptance by the police of a strong degree of control 
exercised over them by the political authorities, certain elements of tension have 
appeared, with impatience being expressed by the police about the enlargement 
of their responsibilities when politicians give the label of public order problems 
to more general social and political problems.
The declining legitimation of political parties and unions, may have 
accentuated this tendency: it may have given a new role to the police, as has 
been noted in recent years for the magistrature in Italy. In this sense, the Italian 
police seem to have acquired some of the characteristics of a people’s police 
(or Biirgerpolizei)—ai least in so far as the search for legitimation in public 
opinion is concerned. On the other hand, however, the organizational structure 
itself of the police, as well as self-definition of their societal role, assign to 
politicians a larger degree of control than that accepted by the police in other 
countries, such as for instance in the U.K.. In this respect, the Italian police 
retain many of the characteristics of the King’s police (Staatspolizei), 
characteristics evident above all in the unproblematized acceptance by the police 
of methods of control exercised through the activity of information gathering 
about social and political actors.
In Italy, in fact, the tasks of gathering information about society for the 
state have been delegated almost entirely to the police. Studies on the police, 
concerning internal activities of information gathering, have distinguished a 
priority on (a) activities of information gathering rather than “active” tactics, and 
(b) information gathering about legal activities rather than illegal ones (Dobry, 
1992: 25). In Italy, up to and including the 1970s, the police units given over 
to the gathering of information were suspected of also undertaking illegal 
activities, utilizing proactive tactics — for example, putting agents provocateurs 
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1990s, in contrast, does seem focus on legal methods of gathering information. 
Yet this activity itself raises doubts about its appropriateness to the functioning 
of a liberal democracy. Above all, the information gathered is to be put in the 
hands of those in government, and not public administrators generally, let alone 
the citizenry and society generally. Secondly, the gathering of information is 
oriented primarily around certain actors and themes which are thought to pose 
possible problems for public order. Thirdly, notwithstanding the fact that 
officially the information is intended to identify certain societal needs or 
problems, it can nevertheless be used as a means to repress certain social groups. 
Fourthly, the competencies necessary to gather and analyse information about 
social, political and economic reality that do not always coincide with what is 
taught at police training school (or even university faculties of law from which 
the major part of police officials come from).
It remains an open question as to exactly to what extent the new 
conception of police involvement based on “dialogue” has been interiorized, and 
to what point this conception is still a pure reflection of requirements that have 
come from elsewhere. It is probable that to stabilize the evolution that has been 
observed during recent years, a legislative reform is necessary in order to 
redefine the tasks and duties of the police and the rights of the citizens in respect 
to these. Perhaps the need to adapt to the application of the Schengen Agreement 
- with the demand this carries for a law to protect personal information - can 
help initiate a debate that has, at least for the time being in Italy, found public 
opinion and political forces, whether of the government or opposition, to be 
particularly deaf to the issues involved.
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